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THE SOUL AND THE VIRTUES IN PROCLUS’ 
COMMENTARY ON THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO  
D. Gregory MacIsaac 
Carleton University, Ottawa 
RÉSUMÉ. Dans la septième dissertation de son Commentaire sur la République de 
Platon, Proclus fournit les éléments d’une philosophie politique néoplatonicienne 
très structurée. Fidèle, de façon générale, à la description platonicienne de l’âme 
tripartite et des quatre vertus cardinales, il introduit cependant d’importantes 
nuances dans cette théorie. L’idée de la prédominance d’une partie de l’âme sur 
une autre et l’idée de « vies mixtes » où deux parties de l’âme prédominent en 
même temps élargissent la description platonicienne des différents types poli-
tiques. En outre, en s’efforçant de donner diverses explications métaphysiques 
de la nature et du nombre des parties de l’âme et des vertus, Proclus inscrit la 
philosophie politique platonicienne plus ou moins tout d’une pièce dans une 
hiérarchie cosmique néoplatonicienne. 
SUMMARY. In the 7th essay of his Commentary on the Republic of Plato, Proclus sup-
plies the elements of a fairly robust Neoplatonic political philosophy. In general he agrees with 
Plato’s account of the tripartite soul and the four cardinal virtues, while introducing important 
nuances into the theory. The idea of the dominance of one part of the soul over another, and the 
idea of ‘mixed lives’, where two parts dominate at once, extend Plato’s account of the various 
political types. Further, in his attempt to give various metaphysical explanations for the nature 
and number of the parts of the soul and the virtues, Proclus inserts Platonic political 
philosophy more or less whole-cloth into a Neoplatonic cosmic hierarchy. 

Philosophie antique, n° 9 (2009), 115-143 
Proclus the Platonic successor was the happiest of men, or so his bio-
grapher Marinus would have us believe. From Plotinus on, Neoplatonic 
authors posited a hierarchy of virtue, conforming to their general idea of 
the analogous structure of reality.1 Marinus used this hierarchy to struc-
ture his Life of Proclus, claiming that Proclus was wise, courageous, tem-
perate, and just in every way, and so possessed the completion of natural, 
moral, political, purifying, contemplative, and theurgic virtue.2 So 
Proclus was happiest (eudaimonestaton), because more than any other man 
he possessed the whole of virtue.3 
With his recent book Platonopolis, Dominic O’Meara has corrected our 
assumption that the Neoplatonists did not have much to say about poli-
tical philosophy.4 In this paper I will examine an aspect of Neoplatonic 
political philosophy which concerns political virtue, by looking at the 
seventh essay of Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic of Plato.5 The fact 
that there are very few studies of this commentary,6 and that it is the last 
major work of Proclus without an English translation either complete or 
 
1. Some of the important texts are Plotinus, Enn. I.2; Porphyry, Sent. 32; Marinus, 
Proclus; Damascius, In Phaed. I, § 138-144; Olympiodorus, In Phaed. 1, § 4.9-5.9. See also 
Proclus, In Remp. I.12.25-13.6; Proclus, In Alc. 96.7-16. And see O’Meara 2003, p.40-49; 
Saffrey & Segonds 2001, introduction, p. lxix-c; Brisson 2004; Baltzly 2004; Baltzly 2006. 
Also useful is Festugière 1969. 
2. Physike, ethike, politike, kathartike, theoretike, and theourgike arete. This scheme varies 
from author to author. Marinus is not able to posit all four virtues equally at every level, 
and gives up the scheme entirely when it comes to the theurgic virtues. See the intro-
duction of Saffrey & Segonds 2001, cited in note 1. 
3. Marinus, Proclus, § 2.5. 
4. O’Meara 2003. 
5. In Remp. I.206.1-235.21. 
6. The list is quite short. For example, there seem to be only four book-length stu-
dies, and all of them deal with some aspect of Proclus’ attitude towards poetry. See Shep-
pard 1980; Cardullo 1985; Kuisma 1996; Pichler 2006. There are a few shorter studies of 
political aspects of the In Rempublicam: Abbate 1999; Abbate 2006; Longo 2002; Nar-
bonne 2004; Perkams 2006; Stalley 1995; Stalley 1999. For a study of the lower parts of 
soul which draws specifically on this essay in the In Rempublicam, see Opsomer 2006. 
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under way,7 underlines O’Meara’s point that we did not notice Neo-
platonic political philosophy mainly because we did not expect to find 
any,8 and so were not looking for it.9 In this context, Proclus’ short essay 
(30 pp. in Kroll’s edition) on the parts of the soul and the political vir-
tues is a good example of an important text which has previously been 
overlooked. What we find in this essay, moreover, is Proclus’ very ambi-
tious attempt to situate the level of political virtue within his overall sys-
tem, by giving a metaphysical account of the number and nature of the 
four virtues and the three parts of the soul from Plato’s Republic. 
I 
In this essay Proclus is not content simply to explain what the poli-
tical virtues are. Rather, he wants to explain why there are political vir-
tues at all, and why they are these four. Because this requires a discussion 
of the parts of the soul and their mutual relation, it is the parts of the 
soul which occupy most of the essay. 
Proclus begins by stating, in effect, that the political virtues come into 
being because of the soul’s relation to its body. He states that the per-
fection (teleiotes) and activity (energeia) of something differs depending on 
whether we consider it in itself, or in relation to something else.10  So just 
as “man” (anthropos) and “master” (despotes) are not the same thing, even 
though a master is also a man, the perfections of man and master will 
not be the same. Likewise, it is not the same thing to consider the soul in 
itself (haplos) and the soul as ruler of the body (somatos archousan).11  
 
7. There is, of course, Festugière 1970, and Abbate 2004 (a partial Italian translation). 
The Platonic Theology is in no modern English translation, but it does exist in the English 
of Thomas Taylor. The Elements of Physics has also not been translated into English, but is 
not usually considered a major work. 
8. See Dillon 2001, p. 243: “Both dialogues [the Republic and the Laws] contain a great 
deal of political theory, and this was not a topic of great concern to Platonists of this 
period.” Dillon does admit, however, some interest among Neoplatonists in political the-
ory (p. 244), and at the beginning of his article he lists the few passages in Middle and 
Neoplatonism which engage with the political content of the Laws. 
9. O’Meara 2003, p. 4: “A consequence of the conventional view…is that no sys-
tematic study of Neoplatonic political philosophy has been attempted.” O’Meara’s long-
standing interest in Neoplatonic political philosophy seems to be the exception rather 
than the rule. Aside from Platonopolis, see for example O’Meara 1992, p. 508ff.; O’Meara 
1999; O’Meara 2002. For a partial consideration of Neoplatonic ethical and political 
thought in relation to Plato himself, see Gerson 2004. For a consideration of the same in 
relation to Medieval thought, see Hankey 2003; Cheneval 1996. 
10. Just as the existence (hyparxis) of something is different from its relation to an-
other thing (pros allo schesis). In Remp I.207.16-20. 
11. In Remp. I.207.20-23. 
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It is the soul as ruler of the body which gives rise to political virtue, 
and it is precisely the relation of ruling or being ruled which interests 
Proclus.12  Each of the three parts of the soul has an activity or work 
considered before any relation, which issues by nature from its essence.13  
The rational part (logos) accomplishes its own work when it lives a puri-
fied (kathartikos) and contemplative (theoretikos) life;14  spirit (thymos) does 
its own work when it takes vengeance, rendering pain for pain; and the 
nature of appetite (epithymia) is an insatiable desire for all pleasures.15  But 
because in the soul which rules the body these parts are not found in iso-
lation, but instead are joined together and live a single life (mian zoen), 
there comes into being political virtue and vice. And so Proclus defines 
political virtue as “a habit which perfects the parts of the soul in their 
mutual relation” and vice as “a habit which destroys the vital relation 
which these parts naturally have towards each other.”16  
The mutual relation which these parts have is one of ruling and being 
ruled.17  So the study of the political virtues turns into an investigation of 
the parts of the soul, their number and nature, in order to specify which 
should rule or be ruled. This is why Proclus’ essay only briefly discusses 
virtue and vice, spending most of its time on an examination of the parts 
of the soul as the underlying question. 
Proclus thinks that the same reasoning holds for the classes in Socra-
tes’ city in speech. They also have a double ergon: the Guardian con-
sidered by himself will seek to rise to the Good through contemplation; 
the Auxiliary will exercise his force indiscriminately, making war when 
and with whom he pleases; and the ‘money-maker’ (chrematistes) will buy 
and sell, seeking only to increase his fortune. But because they exist 
together within the city, their virtues and vices consist in their mutual 
 
12. He adds the term autopragia, independent action, to teleiotes and energeia, as some-
thing which changes with the relation of ruling or being ruled. The verb for ruling is 
archein. In Remp. I.207.30-208.2. 
13. Such an activity is natural, or belongs to the part considered in itself. In Remp. 
I.208.4-5: wJ" e[con oujsivan tina; kaq∆ auJto; kai; ejnevrgeian th'/ oujsiva/ sumbaivnousan h}n 
e[lacen; 208.7-8 [regarding to logikon]: pefuko;" ou{tw zh'n kata; th;n aujtou' oujsivan. 
14. Note that these terms designate the two levels in the hierarchy of virtue which 
come after the political. 
15. In Remp. I.208.5-22. 
16. In Remp. I.208.29-209.2: politikh;n ajreth;n e{xin ou\san teleiwtik;n th'" 
scetikh'" tw'n th'" yuch'" morivwn zwh'", th;n de; ejnantivan tauvth" kakivan e{xin 
diafqeivrousan th;n kata; fuvsin aujtw'n pro;" a[llhla zwtikh;n scevsin. 
17. At In Remp. I.208.19, Proclus refers to Resp. 341d7, where Socrates states that 
every ruling art provides the good for its subjects. See Proclus’ specification of the vari-
ous sorts of rule at In Remp. I.228.20-27. 
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relation of ruling and being ruled.18  According to Proclus, the virtues in 
the soul preexist (prohyparchein) as models (paradeigmata) of the virtues and 
vices in the political classes in Socrates’ city. When they work inside the 
soul, the political virtues order the soul, and when they proceed (pro-
ïousai) outwards, they order the city. 
All forms of rule (hai archai) are relations, both the psychic and the poli-
tical, but those which are exterior are imitations (mimeseis) of the interior 
ones and are secondary activities [issuing] from those which act primarily 
(protourgon). And the true political art is about the interior activities, be-
cause it brings order to the parts which are ruling and ruled in the pri-
mary sense, just as the political art which considers the political classes to 
be images [of the parts of the soul] is [itself] an image (eikon) of the true 
political art. Or rather, the political art is one habit (hexis) which has a 
double activity, one which concerns the parts which rule and are ruled 
inside the soul, and the other which orders external things.19 
So for Proclus the study of political virtue is really the study of the 
soul. 
II 
Proclus thinks that this is exactly what Socrates does in the Republic. 
He begins with a determination of the political classes, and from this is 
 
18. In Remp.I.209.6-210.5. One might think that Proclus’ account here of a double 
activity is similar to Plotinus’ account of the internal and external activity of the hypo-
stases of Nous and Soul, explained through such metaphors as that of heat and fire, 
where the heat in the fire is the internal activity and the heat which radiates is the external 
activity (Enn. V.1.3). But there are important differences between this theory and what 
Proclus is saying here. First, the external activity in Plotinus becomes hypostasised as an 
independent reality. That is to say, Soul can be thought of in a way as the external activity 
of Nous. Second, and because of this first point, there is always a hierachical relation 
between the internal and external activities in Plotinus, with the external subordinate to 
the internal. Neither of these is the case with Proclus’ account here of the same thing 
having one energeia in itself and another in relation to something else. The energeia of mas-
ter, for example, is ruling. If this were the same as Plotinus’ theory, the energeia of master 
would be the slave itself. Further, for the lower parts of the soul, the energeia in itself is 
‘lower’ than the energeia in relation to another, insofar as it is their relation to logos which 
brings them into a better condition than they would have been otherwise. So although at 
various points both Proclus and Plotinus speak of a double activity, their discussions are 
about different things. 
19. In Remp. I.210.25-211.3. I fail to see the need for Kroll’s conjecture here, which 
replaces ou\sa with oujsiva/ at I.211.1. Ousa picks up the uses of ousa in the previous lines, 
and is parallel with echousa in the next phrase, so that the contrast is not between being a 
single habit in essence, with a double activity. Rather, it is a contrast between being a single 
habit, and having a double activity. See also In Remp. I.217.11, where the virtues of the 
whole city are called eikones of those in the individual soul. 
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able to determine the virtues appropriate to each. On the basis of this, 
Socrates is then able to determine the parts of the soul itself and its 
virtues.20  Proclus claims that this is the proper order to proceed because, 
“you cannot know any of the interior habits (hexeis) of the soul and the 
activities which remain (menousas) inside it in any other manner than by 
beginning from the activities which proceed (proïouson) outwards.”21  Pro-
clus might mean that an empirical study of men’s actions in the city is 
necessary in order to draw universal conclusions about the content of 
 
20. In Remp. I.217.6-228.27. Abbate 2006 discusses Proclus’ account of Justice and 
Temperance, in this 7th essay. Abbate’s thesis is that it is through these virtues that Pro-
clus thinks the Soul is one, and imitates analogically the One as the Principle of all things. 
I think this is correct, but I would emphasise that in saying that Justice and Temperance 
impart a harmony to the Soul which makes it one, this does not mean that its multiplicity 
is lost. In fact, it is important to keep in mind that the manner in which the Soul is many 
is also its manner of being one. The soul’s harmony is its unity, because what for the One 
is unspeakable simplicity, on the psychic level is the harmony of various parts. Harmony 
holds the analogical place of unity here. My point is that we shouldn’t think that harmony 
is one thing and the unity which it brings about is another. The unity of a body is its or-
ganic coherence, the unity of a table is the physical attachment of its parts, the unity of a 
city is the harmony of its citizens, and the unity of the Soul is the harmony of its various 
parts.  
At the end of his essay, Abbate makes the point that politics in Proclus is not possible 
without a metaphysical-theological foundation. He states, “The city of men must assimi-
late itself, as far as possible, into the perfect harmony of the cosmos, which depends on 
the providential care of the Demiurge. In conclusion, this means that politics has to assi-
milate itself into metaphysics and theology. In Proclus, political theorization actually 
takes the shape of a metaphysical-theological politics. Consequently, the philosopher is 
not conceived as a true ruler, but as an imitator of the demiurgic action which assures the 
good and the prosperity of the ‘Whole’ as an organic and harmonious unity” (p. 198). I 
think Abbate is fundamentally correct here, with the caveat that it is not clear what he 
means by saying that the philosopher is not a true ruler. As Abbate points out, the Demi-
urge is called by Proclus at various points the highest ‘politician’ of the cosmos, in that he 
brings its various parts into harmonious order. And Proclus thinks that Plato’s true 
Guardian, the philosopher, plays an analogous role for the city. But why say that the phi-
losopher is not a true ruler? The metaphysical principle of analogy is what makes the 
harmony in the city an image of, and indeed a lower manifestation of, the harmony of the 
parts of the cosmos. And this truth can only be understood through the sort of theore-
tical metaphysics which Proclus is doing. The Procline Philosopher King must possess 
this metaphysical knowledge in order to know what to aim at in his legislation. But in 
reforming the city in accordance with divine models, when turning from the order of the 
cosmos to the ordering of the Cave, it would seem that he is in fact a true ruler. My point 
is that Proclus’ political philosophy, as Abbate demonstrates clearly, is completely depen-
dent on his metaphysics. But the practical activity of ruling – political action as opposed 
to political theory – cannot itself be metaphysical speculation. Rather, it is the practical 
bringing about of the harmony of the various classes in the city through concrete legis-
lation. And Abbate seems to think this too, hence it is not clear to me what he means by 
saying the philosopher is not a true ruler. 
21. In Remp. I.210.17-20. 
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the soul. And he does mean this, in a sense. But Proclus is obviously not 
an empiricist, so any investigation of political action must serve to re-
mind the soul about its own innate ideas. His general theory of discursive 
reason (dianoia) states that we know the logoi which remain in the soul’s 
essence (ousia) through the activities which proceed from this essence, 
which he calls projections (probolai).22  That this is an ontological as well 
as an epistemological doctrine is illustrated nicely here. In the same way 
as we know the soul’s ousia through the processions which are our 
thoughts, Proclus clearly thinks that we can come to recollect the struc-
ture of the soul through the activities (energeiai) which proceed from it, 
the actions of men in the city. 
That this is really a theoretical, not an empirical, investigation is 
shown by Socrates’ procedure in the Republic, because Socrates deter-
mines the classes in the ideal city according to necessity. Proclus points 
out that Socrates introduces the classes in a certain order (en taxei), be-
cause he begins with “men who spend their time on only the necessities 
of life (ta anankaia), without experience of war or education, living accor-
ding to nature (kata physin).”23  Necessity leads him to introduce a soldier 
class, because of external enemies. And finally, because there must be 
(dein) an education for the soldier class, the philosophers are needed.24  
This is not an investigation of how things are in various cities so much as 
how they must be in the well-ordered city. 
Proclus’ account of the virtues in the city is as one would expect, with 
one interesting addition. He thinks that it is their excellence in mousike 
which has disposed the rulers of the city towards wisdom, because it has 
taught them about goods and evils. So the city is wise because of its ru-
lers, courageous through the soldiers, temperate especially because of the 
money-makers, and their mutual agreement about who rules and who is 
ruled, each class carrying out its own proper role, makes the city just.25  
Before showing how Socrates distinguishes the parts of the soul, Pro-
clus claims that the ways of life which characterise different peoples have 
their source in the domination of their souls by one or another part. So 
the Greeks are inclined to phronesis, the Thracians are more thymotic, and 
the Phoenicians are inclined to money-making. In the first logos domi-
nates, and in the other two thymos and epithymia, respectively.26  Proclus 
probably included this discussion in order to illustrate the point which he 
 
22. See MacIsaac 2001. 
23. In Remp.I. 217.19-20. 
24. In Remp. I.218.18-19. 
25. In Remp. I.219.17-220.8. 
26. In Remp. I.221.20-24. 
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made earlier, that the exterior activities of the soul, political actions, issue 
from and are images of the soul’s interior activities. 
Proclus’ explanation of how Socrates distinguishes the three parts of 
the soul is, again, what one would expect.27  The inability to undergo 
 
27. Perkams 2006 argues that Proclus’ account of the parts of the soul differs greatly 
from that of his predecessors. He says that earlier Neoplatonic thinkers hold that the soul 
is substantially one, and that its parts are different powers, and so that it is polydynamos. 
Proclus, according to Perkams, thinks instead that the parts of the soul are different sub-
stances (ousiai). Perkams’ evidence for this is drawn largely from this 7th essay in Proclus’ 
Republic commentary. Perkams thinks that this is a bold innovation on Proclus’ part, 
intended to explain how the soul can have both rational and irrational functions: “on the 
one hand, the transcendent rational soul cannot be the same substance than [sic] the non-
rational, which is not separable from a perishable body” (p. 179). The soul is still a unity, 
however, because the lower substances are irradiations of the higher, and have a sort of 
hylomorphic relation, according to which the higher substance informs the lower as mat-
ter (p. 177, 179). The soul unfolds itself into different substances simply as a part of the 
self-diversifying unfolding of the cosmos as a whole (p. 181). While I agree with Per-
kams’ account of how the soul is one, because in Proclus things are both one and many 
through their self-unfolding, I think his main thesis that in Proclus there are many sub-
stances in the soul is misleading. It is one thing to say that logos, thymos, and epithymia differ 
kat’ousian, as Proclus does, and as Perkams points out (In Remp. I.207.9-10, I.224.18ff.). 
But this is not the same thing as saying that they are different substances, in the manner 
in which Perkams seems to understand this. He says that Proclus’ soul “is a compound 
of several beings or substances, each different from the others” (p. 167). He interprets 
Proclus’ statement of difference kat’ousian to mean that “Proclus introduces within the 
soul the broadest ontological difference allowed by the Aristotelian terminology: Plato’s 
three parts of the soul are much more different from each other than simple faculties, 
they are even more different than the parts of one substance – each of them is a single 
entity with a proper definition and a proper way of perfection” (p. 172. See also, 176, 
177, 182). This way of speaking is too Aristotelian to capture what Proclus means. The 
fact alone that Proclus thinks the ousia of the soul is self-diversifying, and that parts of it 
can serve as quasi-formal principles for other parts as quasi-material principles, shows 
how far Proclus’ understanding of ousia is from Aristotle’s. To say that two things differ 
kat’ousian in Proclus is not primarily to say that they are separately existing subjects, sepa-
rate ‘thises’. Rather, it is to say that they differ in their being, in what they are, and that 
they are not simply two powers or operations of something which is single in being. This 
mode of speaking can apply to different parts of a single ousia. How else could the parts 
of a single ousia differ from one another than kat’ousian? They certainly will not differ 
only kata dynamin or kat’energeian. Proclus’ account of the soul in the Timaeus commentary 
indicates an extremely complicated structure, in which its ousia is divided into many 
different parts but is still one (In Tim. II.47ff., II.147.19-257.29. See esp. II.257.10-29). 
And in this 7th essay, Proclus distinguishes between memory and sensation, saying that 
their existence (hyparxis) is distinct from each other in relation to a single ousia, an ousia, 
however, which possesses an essential multiplicity (plethos ousiodes) (In Remp. I.233.18-23). 
In the line previous, he says that the Form of this nature (touto tes phuseos to eidos) is both 
one and many, probably referring to the soul’s ousia as both one and many. In the Euclid 
commentary, Proclus says that the soul contains the straight and the circular kat’ousian, 
referring to the Timaeus, because this allows it to be allied to the intelligibles (circle) and 
preside over the sensibles (straight) (In Eucl. 1087.10-109.4). In other words, it exercises 
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contraries at the same time and in the same respect shows that logos, 
thymos, and epithymia are distinct.28  However, his description of the soul’s 
virtues is interesting. If Socrates had wanted to use language which was 
familiar to the many, “he would have said that phronesis is the virtue of 
logos, courage is the virtue of thymos, justice the virtue of the money-
loving part of epithymia, and temperance of the other part of epithymia, the 
pleasure-loving part.”29  Instead, Proclus says, he wanted to show how 
the virtues in the soul are analogically related to the political classes, and 
therefore defines them in terms of which parts of the soul rule, and 
which are ruled. 
So Proclus finds in Socrates’ procedure in the Republic an invest-
igation which begins from the external activities of the soul and returns 
inwards, from the images in the political sphere to the paradigms in the 
soul. In the city and in the soul animating a body there are three parts, 
and political virtue in each case has to do with the mutual relation of 
ruling and being ruled. 
III 
So far I have presented the parts of Proclus’ account which stay fairly 
close to the Republic. In two ways, however, Proclus goes far beyond 
Plato in this essay. The first way is by raising and answering questions 
 
rational and irrational functions in virtue of the complexity of its ousia, not in virtue of 
having more than one ousia. I don’t see much difference between the circular and 
straight, in that context, and between logos on the one hand, and thymos and epithymia on 
the other, here. The passage which might be thought to support Perkam’s language most 
strongly is also what decides against it, at In Remp. I.226: “Therefore the appetitive part is 
essentially (kat’ousian) one and many, and because of this it also has powers (dynameis) 
which fight [against each other], because they issue from different substances (apo ousion 
diapherouson hormemenas).” Proclus is arguing here that the appetitive part is not more than 
one part, and that the division into logos, thymos, and epithymia doesn’t have to be com-
plicated by further subdividing epithymia in two. Rather, the multiplicity of epithymia is be-
cause of its relation to the body. But if Proclus can say with regard to epithymia even that 
it has different ousiai, but that it is one and many kat’ousian, clearly meaning not that it is 
many things but that it is one ousia which is internally complex, it is likely that this is his 
account of the ousia of the soul as a whole. So this overly Aristotelian language of distinct 
substances gives a mistaken impression of what is going on here. Rather, a Procline ousia 
is just the sort of thing which is one and many at the same time, and each of its parts dif-
fers kat’ousian from each other. It is likely that Proclus’ distinction from his predecessors, 
who according to Perkams called logos, thymos, and epithymia mere dynameis of the soul, has 
its source in the implausibility of a simple ousia without parts carrying out radically dif-
ferent and opposed activities. So while Perkams is generally accurate in his account of the 
internal complexity of the Procline soul, and is correct to notice Proclus’ bold theory of 
the self-diversification of the soul’s ousia, his overly Aristotelian description obscures how 
bold it is, how the soul’s ousia in Proclus really is both one and many at the same time. 
28. In Remp. I.223.1-224.19. 
29. In Remp. I.228.4-7. See below for the division of epithymia into two parts. 
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which Plato does not deal with. The main examples of this are: (1) If 
both logos and thymos rule within the soul, why do they have distinct vir-
tues?30  (2) If epithymia desires contraries, how can it still be a single part 
of the soul?31  (3) Why are there only three parts of the soul?32  (4) How 
are aisthesis and phantasia related to the three parts enumerated in the Re-
public, and why do they not serve to increase the number of parts beyond 
three?33  (5) Why is the soul still one, if it has three parts?34  
The second way in which Proclus goes beyond Plato follows from 
the first. Proclus naturally solves the questions which arise in Plato’s text 
by explaining what he thinks is the truth about the cosmos. In so doing, 
he fits what he finds in the Republic into his own system, and does so as 
usual while attributing his own doctrines to Plato. We will see that 
Proclus’ attempt here is not entirely successful, and by invoking different 
aspects of his system at different points, he ends up making a few asser-
tions that are difficult to reconcile with each other. In the end, I think we 
have to read his treatment as a series of (hopefully) complementary ana-
lyses of that unified thing which is the soul. 
We must admit, as well, that Proclus’ treatment of his subject here 
does not make it easy to see in a clear and orderly manner what he is up 
to. The great difficulty in coming to know Proclus’ philosophy well is 
less a function of its complexity, than of the manner in which he pre-
sents it. The majority of his works are commentaries on Plato, each con-
sisting of a series of discussions which arise from the various lemmata 
from the Platonic text. In effect, Proclus usually presents his system, 
which is many times more complex than Plato’s philosophy, by closely 
following not its own internal movement, but the order of topics which 
he finds in various dialogues. Consequently, while his works usually have 
some sort of overall plan, they often do not give a very orderly and clear 
presentation of their subject matter. The Elements of Theology is the great 
exception, with the Platonic Theology and the commentary on Euclid being 
more orderly than most. The Republic commentary is an interesting case. 
It is not a continuous commentary, but in fact only a series of essays on 
various parts of the Republic, varying greatly in length. Within this 7th Es-
say, Proclus does not comment on lemmata, but rather under the general 
rubric of an examination of the parts of the soul and its virtues, in itself 
 
30. In Remp. I.214.8ff. I will not discuss this in detail. The quick answer is that they 
rule in different ways. Logos rules by making correct judgements, while thymos rules by 
exerting force against epithymia. See In Remp. I.214.8-215.27. 
31. In Remp. I.225.4ff. 
32. In Remp. I.229.1ff. 
33. In Remp. I.232.15ff. 
34. In Remp. I.234.1ff. 
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and in relation to the city, he presents a series of discussions which are 
sometimes only loosely related to each other.35 Festugière divides the 
essay in three, providing the headings: A) Consideration of the subject in 
itself; B) How Socrates has treated the subject; and C) Corrolaries. In 
what follows I will be moving back and forth between the various parts, 
and at times emphasising discussions which in the text are very brief,36 in 
order to show more systematically than is immediately apparent from the 
text what Proclus is up to.37 
IV 
Because the investigation of the political virtues is really an inves-
tigation of the parts of the Soul, Proclus supplies various explanations of 
why there are three, and only three, parts in the soul which rules the 
body, and the relations between the parts. What follows are the four 
main explanations of this question. 
(1) Ruling and being ruled: Proclus’ main account, as I have stated 
above, is the relation of ruling and being ruled. Logos rules because it is 
naturally related to nous, and epithymia is ruled because it naturally con-
cerns the body. Thymos both rules and is ruled. It is ruled because, like 
epithymia, it needs to be directed by logos. But it also rules, because it as-
 
35. For example, in the middle of his discussion of which parts of the soul rule and 
which are ruled, and how these relations generated the need for the four virtues, he pre-
sents an entire page on the Pythagorean doctrine of the fourth, the fifth, and the octave 
as a comment on Plato’s remark that temperance is a sort of “consonance and harmony” 
(430e). See In Remp. I.212.25-213.28. 
36. For example, his treatment of hyparxis, dynamis, nous (In Remp. I.226.15-23), and 
his discussion of the three-quality theory of body and soul (In Remp. I.229.9-230.5). 
37. Proclus treats the subject as a whole in the following order, giving a number of 
minor points long digressions, citing a number of important metaphysical principles only 
in passing, and treating the same or similar subjects more than once. These are the main 
topics: (1) That the consideration of the parts of the soul and the political classes differs 
if they are taken in themselves or in relation to each other (I.207.14ff.); (2) That the vir-
tues are four in number, in the soul and in the city, with an explanation of the relations of 
ruling and being ruled (I.211.4ff.); (3) Socrates’ determination of the three classes and the 
virtues corresponding to each class (I.217.6ff.); (4) The diversity of virtues in different 
nations (I.221.12ff.); (5) That the three parts of the soul are not the same as each other, 
including a discussion of why epithymia is only one part, and how the triad hyparxis, dyna-
mis, nous shows that the soul has three parts (I.223.1ff.); (6) Another discussion of the 
four virtues in the soul (I.227.27ff.); (7) Why there are only three parts in the soul, includ-
ing a discussion of the three-quality theory of body and soul, and intermediate forms of 
life making use of more than one part (I.228.28ff.); (8) A discussion of aisthesis and phan-
tasia (I.232.15ff.); (9) How the soul is one, although three (I.233.29ff.); (9) Presentation of 
an overall schema by which the irrational powers are images of the parts of the rational 
soul (I.235.1ff.). 
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sists logos when epithymia fights against it.38  We can see here Proclus’ prin-
ciple of mean terms, so that in between that which desires nous and rules, 
and that which desires the body and is ruled, is something which both 
rules and is ruled, and which does not desire the body but which also is 
not rational.39 This idea of thymos as intermediary will be seen in a dif-
ferent manner below, in the three-quality theory of the soul and body. 
These relations of ruling and being ruled give rise to the virtues. Logos 
has phronesis as its virtue, according to which it determines standards of 
action for itself and the other parts. Epithymia has temperance, according 
to which it regulates its desires, turning itself (epistrephomene) towards logos. 
The virtue of thymos is courage, as ruling, according to which it keeps epi-
thymia down, and temperance, because it also accepts its rules from logos. 
Justice is the virtue of all three parts, insofar as they retain their proper 
role as ruling, being ruled, or both ruling and being ruled.40  
At the beginning of this essay, Proclus specifies that he is examining 
the “soul as ruler of the body (psychen somatos archousan).”41  His discussion 
of the parts of the soul clarifies what he means by that phrase. On the 
one hand, the soul rules the body itself, because without the soul the bo-
dy would just be a dead thing. But according to Proclus in this essay the 
body itself has no appetites.42  All bodily desires come from epithymia. So 
the soul rules the body, in the most accurate sense, by ruling itself, when 
logos lays down rules for epithymia, and thymos helps enforce those rules. 
(2) The three-quality theory of body and soul: Proclus puts forward a three-
quality theory of body and soul in order to explain why there are three, 
and only three parts of the soul ruling the body. This theory is modelled 
after his three-quality theory of the elements in his Commentary on the 
Timaeus, where it is stated more elaborately and in more mathematical 
terms.43  He states it briefly here by saying that for any two objects which 
have three opposed properties there exist two mean terms. Each mean 
 
38. In Remp. I.211.4-26. 
39. This principle is stated in El. Th. prop. 28, “Every producing cause brings into 
existence things like to itself before the unlike.” This proposition has to do with causa-
tion, but it dictates that there are no gaps in the Procline universe, so that at no point in 
the unfolding can there be absolute difference between terms. Taken schematically, as 
Proclus does here, it means that between any two hierarchically ordered terms which are 
dissimilar you will find a term which is similar to the higher in one way and the lower in 
another. 
40. In Remp. I.211.26-212.20; 213.28-214.7 
41. In Remp. I.207.22-23. 
42. We will examine this next, with the three-quality theory of body and soul. 
43. In Tim. II.28.15-42.1, see esp. II.39.20-41.14. See also MacIsaac 2001. In the In 
Timaeum Proclus gives an elaborate explanation of this doctrine of mean terms, showing 
how it is true arithmetically and geometrically, and how it applies to the physical qualities 
of the four elements. Cf. El. Th. prop. 28, and note 39 above. 
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term shares two properties with its closest extreme, and the mean terms 
themselves share two properties. In this way, the opposed extremes are 
joined by means. In the Timaeus commentary Proclus uses this theory to 
explain why between Fire and Earth we find Air and Water. 
Each element is either Subtle or Dense; Penetrating or Obtuse; very 
Mobile or Immobile. The schema of the elements is as follows: 
Fire: Subtle Penetrating Mobile 
Air: Subtle Obtuse Mobile 
Water: Dense Obtuse Mobile 
Earth: Dense Obtuse Immobile 
So Air and Water, each sharing two of their three qualities with their 
neighbours, are mean terms between Fire and Earth. With regard to soul 
and body, Proclus says that the three qualities have to do with being (on), 
life (zoe), and intellect (nous), so that the operative qualities are partless 
(ameres) or having many parts (polymeres); having appetition (orektikon) or 
having no appetite (anorekton); being intelligent (noetikon) or not intel-
ligent (anoeton).44  
 on  zo e nous 
Logo s partless appetition intelligent 
Thymos partless appetition not intelligent 
Epithymia parts appetition not intelligent 
Body parts no appetite not intelligent 
So thymos and epithymia here are thought of as means between logos and 
body, and communicate with each of their neighbours by sharing two of 
their three qualities with them.45 
We should notice a few things about this scheme. First, Proclus holds 
that all three parts of the soul have appetite, but the appetites of logos and 
thymos are for non-bodily things (the intelligibles and honour, respec-
tively), while the appetite of epithymia is for the body and bodily things.46  
Second, Proclus says that thymos is partless because it is “simple (haplous) 
in its own nature and because of this forms one class of citizens (mian… 
politeian).”47  It is not clear if Proclus can assert the simplicity of thymos in 
this manner, and below we will see how thymos is also double. Epithymia 
has parts, Proclus says, “which is why it is called a beast with many heads 
(polykephalon legetai therion) and belongs to many classes of citizens (eis 
 
44. In Remp. I.229.9-230.5. 
45. For a very good analysis of the lower parts of the soul in Proclus, see Opsomer 
2006. 
46. In Remp. I.231.1-8. 
47. In Remp. I.229.20-21. 
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pleious syntelei politeias).”48  What Proclus means by this is probably that 
members of the soldier class are simply soldiers, while the money-makers 
are engaged in many different sorts of work in order to make money. 
Finally, notice that the only difference between thymos and epithymia is 
that one is partless and the other has parts. This seems to be a strange 
parsing of the Republic, but I think it makes sense. In effect, the 
distinction between these two parts of the soul is that one looks upward 
towards the partlessness of the immaterial and the other looks 
downward towards body. This will be confirmed by the third and fourth 
explanations of the soul’s parts, which we will examine next. 
3) Hyparxis, dynamis, nous: Proclus uses the triad of hyparxis, dynamis, 
nous to explain why epithymia is a friend of the body, but in so doing he 
supplies another explanation of why there are three parts of the soul.49 
He states that the reflections (emphaseis) of the terms of the triad hyparxis, 
dynamis, nous reach different levels of the soul. These varying reflections 
of the prior triad determine the object of the appetite which each part of 
the soul has. But they also obviously give a compelling reason as to why 
there are three parts, because we should expect the soul as an image of 
its principles to display their triadic structure. 
The reflection of hyparxis reaches all the way to epithymia, and so epi-
thymia loves the body. The connection between hyparxis and love of the 
body, according to Proclus, is that the body participates only in hyparxis, 
not dynamis or nous.50 Thymos loves dynamis and logos desires nous, because 
the reflections of these two principles reach as far as these parts of the 
soul. Proclus invokes here his principle that “the reflections of the first 
[principles] reach through more things [than those of the secondary prin-
ciples]… and the higher [principles] are objects of desire for more things 
 
48. In Remp. I.229.24-25. 
49. In Remp. I.226.15-23. 
50. In Remp. I.226.14-16: kai; tauvth" [scil. uJpavrxew"] me;n h{kei kai; eij" to; trivton hJ 
e[mfasi", kai; dia; tou'to ejra'/ swvmato", o} metevcei movnh" ejkeivnh". Proclus does not 
give an explanation here of why the body participates only in hyparxis. However, his rea-
soning is likely as follows. The power of the higher cause extends further than the lower 
cause. In the triad hyparxis, dynamis, nous, the first term is hyparxis (existence) because of its 
greater simplicity than dynamis or nous. This greater simplicity of the higher cause has its 
mirror image in the greater simplicity of the lower effect. The body does not exhibit the 
complexity of dynamis, because it does not live, nor of nous because it does not think. Re-
member that hyparxis, dynamis, nous is parallel to on, zoe, nous and all other Procline triads. 
Therefore, its lack of complexity indicates that the causal power of these lower principles 
have been exhausted at this point, and all that is left for body to participate is hyparxis. 
Note as well that Proclus is using a triad to explain the structure of four terms, with body 
being the fourth term. See props. 56-58 of the Elements of Theology, where the power of the 
higher cause extends further than that of the lower. See Dodd’s note on p. 232 of his 
edition, and Plat. Theol. III.6.21-26 Saffrey-Westerink, which Dodds refers to (as 127-9). 
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than are the lower [principles]. So the lowest part of the soul is a lover of 
the body and desires only this, to save the body.”51  
 
Before considering the fourth and final explanatory scheme, we need 
to discuss two related points. First, we should note that the second and 
third explanations for the parts of the soul, the three-quality theory and 
the soul as an image of hyparxis, dynamis, nous allow us to understand why 
thymos is an ally of logos and not epithymia. Body has only hyparxis and so 
epithymia as the final part, having only the emphasis of hyparxis, can only 
desire body. Likewise with the three-quality theory, epithymia shares the 
quality with body of having many parts, and so its appetite is directed 
towards the body. Thymos, on the other hand, has the reflections of a 
higher principle, dynamis, so even though it is irrational it can aspire to 
more than body. Similarly, in the three-quality theory, the partlessness of 
thymos allows its desire to aim at the immaterial, which is likewise partless. 
Both of these taken together illumine Proclus’ account of thymos within 
the schema of ruling and being ruled. Thymos must be ruled, because it is 
irrational, but because its desire tends towards something immaterial, 
towards honour rather than towards bodily things, it is the natural ally of 
logos and can assist it in ruling epithymia. The fourth explanation which 
Proclus gives, which we will examine below, confirms this interpretation, 
phrasing it in terms of the direction of the appetite: the appetite of thymos 
is directed upwards, while that of epithymia aims downwards. 
Even though it is the natural ally of logos, however, thymos is more 
connatural (syngenesteron) with epithymia than with logos: “These two [thymos 
and epithymia] have the same father, while logos has a different father; 
these two are mortal and either exist or do not exist together, while logos 
is immortal; these two cannot receive knowledge, while logos by nature is 
cognitive (gnostikos).”52  This suggests that the two lower parts of the soul 
come into existence with the body, and pass away at its death. However, 
 
51. In Remp. I.226.18-22. Cf. El. Th. props. 56-58. 
52. In Remp. I.215.4-7. 
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Proclus’ account of the soul’s various bodies is rather complex. In short, 
thymos and epithymia belong to the soul’s middle sort of body, the pneu-
matic vehicle, and survive as long as it survives. Therefore they survive 
the soul’s various incarnations in a material body, but pass away with the 
pneumatic body at the end of the soul’s total cycle of reincarnations.53 
The second side-point concerns aisthesis and phantasia, which Proclus 
discusses near the end of his essay. These differ from the three parts of 
the soul already enumerated, and from each other. Aisthesis is described 
in interesting terms. It is different from logos because it is alogos; but it dif-
fers from the alogoi parts thymos and epithymia, because they are appetitive 
(orektikon) while it is cognitive (gnostikon). Moreoever, aisthesis underlies 
(hypokeitai) the other three parts, insofar as the recollections (anamneseis) 
of logos are di’ aistheseos, and the movements of the other two are met’ ais-
theseos.54  Phantasia, for its part, differs from aisthesis because it can con-
serve its impressions, and belonging to the memorative (mnemoneutikon) 
part of the soul it is closer to logos than is aisthesis, because it receives its 
impressions (typous) from there as well as from aisthesis.55  
 
53. Proclus thinks there are three types of body which the soul animates, only the 
lowest of which is what we think of normally as the material body. Each soul has a first 
body, or vehicle (ochema), which is not temporally generated and which is indestructible, 
because each soul in virtue simply of its existence ensouls a body. Therefore, if souls are 
immortal, the primary body which they ensoul cannot be one which is generated and 
destroyed. Further, Proclus has reasons for thinking that some lower psychic functions 
survive the death of the material body, but are not attached to the highest body. Hence 
he posits a third body, between the two extremes, the pneumatic body, which survives 
the death of the material body but is itself eventually destroyed and re-generated. The 
acquisition of a lower body is described in a metaphorical sense as a putting on of a ‘gar-
ment’ (chiton), and it is through these additions to the soul that the lower psychic func-
tions come to be. See El. Th. props. 196, 205, 207-210, and esp. Dodd’s note on prop. 
209, p. 306-308. See also Opsomer 2006. Opsomer details the soul-powers which attach 
to (a) the aitherodes or augoeides ochema (aetherical or luminous body), (b) the pneumatic 
body, and (c) the hyliaion, ostreinon or ostreodes ochema (material, or oyster body). See p. 147 
ff., and In Tim. III.237.2-6; III.298.23-27; and III.299.27-300.13, which he refers to. 
54. In Remp. I.232.15-233.3. 
55. In Remp. I.233.3-28. In his discussion in this text, Proclus considers the possibility 
that phantasia is double, with one part belonging to sensation and the other to memory. 
However, I think he decides that its ability to preserve impressions, as well as its ability to 
receive impressions from logos as well as aisthesis show that phantasia and aisthesis are dif-
ferent. Phantasia is related to and makes use of aisthesis, but they are not to be identified. 
Opsomer 2006, p. 143-144, interprets this passage slightly differently, concluding that 
there is a higher and a lower phantasia, a mnemoneutike and aisthetike sort respectively. The 
interpretation turns on whether the distinction between to mnemoneutikon and to aisthetikon 
at I.233.22-23 refers to a memorative part and a sensible part of phantasia, or whether to 
mnemoneutikon itself is phantasia, distinct from aisthesis. I think Proclus’ point above 
(I.233.14-15), referring to the Philebus, that the painter in the soul belongs to the 
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Why does Proclus still think that the soul has three parts, if he 
himself clearly states that there are two others besides the three in Plato’s 
text? The answer comes in a brief comment at the end of his discussion 
of aisthesis and phantasia: “And enough about these parts, so we hold that, 
even if there should be other parts of the irrational soul, the present 
inquiry is about those parts which are useful with regard to political 
virtue, and about those being educated in this virtue.”56  Political virtue 
comes about because of the relation of ruling and being ruled, which has 
to do with appetites and the actions which issue from them. Although 
aisthesis and phantasia are related to appetites, they are not themselves 
appetitive, and so do not come under the study of political virtue. Hence 
there are only three parts of the soul, we now understand, in the sense 
that there are only three that are relevant to the investigation of political 
virtue and education found in the Republic. 
4) Overall schema: In the final half page of this essay, Proclus quickly 
gives an overall scheme of how the parts of the soul are related to each 
other.57 He says that the rational soul has both knowledge and appetite, 
and that each of these are themselves double, one branch tending up-
wards towards being or the immaterial, and the other downwards to-
wards becoming. Moreover, the irrational powers of the soul are images 
of these four, so that there exist an upward and a downward moving 
cognition and appetite in the irrational soul: 
 
 
phantastikon and the scribe to koinen aisthesin, decides the point that this is the basic 
distinction. 
56. In Remp. I.233.25-28. 
57. In Remp. I.235.1-21. 
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This scheme gives an account of why the various parts of the irratio-
nal soul exist, and why only thymos and epithymia are appetitive, and so 
relevant to political virtue. However, it raises a few questions as well, 
mainly having to do with the other schemata. With regard to the three-
quality theory, how should we characterise phantasia and aisthesis?58  They 
would both seem to be partless, have no appetite, and be intelligent. This 
would allow them to communicate with logos through two shared quali-
ties, but not with anything else in the scheme. And if the three-quality 
scheme is meant to be a parallel to the three-quality theory of the ele-
ments, we should be surprised to find ‘more’ elements than the two ex-
tremes and the two means.59 
With regard to the soul as an image of hyparxis, dynamis, nous, how do 
the extra parts fit into the scheme? Both of these questions might be ans-
wered by saying that the earlier analyses are limited, because they focus 
only on the parts of the soul with appetite, or that are relevant to poli-
tical virtue, and that this final scheme is a sort of widening of the view, 
to take in more of the complexity of Proclus’ system. But in fact, even 
this scheme given in the final page doesn’t capture all of the complexity 
in this essay itself, because at various places Proclus discusses how both 
thymos and epithymia have multiple desires. We will see that, while the 
complexity of thymos and epithymia might cause problems for the elegance 
of his various explanatory schemata, it will allow him to explain why 
political actions are many and various.  
Finally, it is suprising to find only noesis and doxa as the knowing parts 
of the logike psyche. One would expect dianoia between them.60 This may 
perhaps be solved by saying that in this essay Proclus does not distin-
guish too clearly between the soul’s discursive and non-discursive know-
ing powers, in order to remain close to the Platonic text. However, I 
think it points to another conclusion. Even the ‘overall scheme’ which 
we find here is a limited analysis. It gives the impression of being exhaus-
tive, but actually leaves things out in order to fit the Republic text which is 
being examined.  
 
58. The appetitive parts of the logike psyche here can be considered to supply the qua-
lity “appetitive” in the three-quality theory. 
59. The three-quality theory is introduced, both with regard to the elements and with 
regard to the soul, in order to explain why two extremes with three qualities need to be 
joined by two mean terms. Note, however, that there are eight logically possible terms 
with one or the other of each of the three qualities. 
60. Opsomer 2006, p. 144, in fact inserts dianoia into the scheme between noesis and 
doxa, referring to other texts. However, this does not solve the problem that this scheme 
is supposed to demonstrate how the irrational powers are images of and fall into the 
same divisions as the logike psyche. What irrational power would fall between phantasia and 
aisthesis as the image of dianoia? 
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In fact, I think, all of Proclus’ systematic taxonomies of the soul’s 
parts are like this. They give the impression of being complete, but 
should be read as mutually complementary. In other words, no one ana-
lysis captures exhaustively all of the complexity of the soul, and our 
understanding of it comes rather from generating complementary discur-
sive accounts taken from different perspectives. I think further that this 
sort of complementarity of accounts is derived from the inherent par-
tiality of dianoia, in Proclus, and applies to his accounts of the other parts 
of his system. A discursive logos in Proclus is most often a divided image 
of a noetic reality, which points beyond itself to its noetic source. It in 
principle is not where thought must rest, but must point thought beyond 
discursivity.  
Proclus is, paradoxically, an extremely systematic thinker, but one 
whose theory of philosophy precludes a completed discursive system, 
whether or not he himself realised this. If the Procline soul stops pro-
jecting its discursive logoi, it is not because it has reached some sort of 
dianoetic completion, but rather because it has either passed beyond 
dianoia to noesis, or given into the passivity of the body and started feeling 
instead of thinking. A soul which stays at the level of dianoia, but has no 
need to continue to generate accounts is an oxymoron in Procline terms. 
I think this is why we have a diversity of analyses in Proclus, the most 
obvious being the difference between the Platonic and the Orphic/ 
Chaldaen set of terms. Moreover, we also have a diversity of philo-
sophical styles, from the more geometrico style of the Elements of Theology, to 
the practice of philosophy through the etymology of divine names, in his 
commentary on the Cratylus, to the use of a succession of lemmata as 
leaping off points for the exposition of difficult questions in Platonic 
metaphysics, in commentaries like that on the Parmenides and the Timaeus, 
to an almost devotional style in his commentary on the Chaldean Oracles 
and his hymns.61 
V 
Socrates shows that the three parts of the soul differ by invoking the 
principle that the same thing can not undergo contraries. But what 
should we say, asks Proclus, about the love of pleasure and the love of 
money? Both belong to epithymia, yet they are often opposed to each 
other. Should not this opposition show that epithymia is in fact double, 
and so that there are four parts to the soul?62  Or if it does not, then the 
 
61. See MacIsaac 2009. 
62. Note that if there are more than three parts in the soul, according to Proclus, we 
will need more than the four cardinal virtues. See In Remp. I.228.28-229.9. 
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other oppositions do not show that logos, thymos, and epithymia are essen-
tially different (kat’ousian). Proclus’ solution is to remind his reader that 
Socrates calls epithymia a beast with many heads. By this he means that 
epithymia is one, because it is thoroughly characterised by love of the 
body, and in this it differs from thymos and logos. But it is also many, pre-
cisely because of its association with the body. It is essentially one and 
many (hen te on kai polla kat’ousian).63  Basically, Proclus concedes the 
point that undergoing contraries shows that epithymia is not a simple ou-
sia, while also asserting that it is exactly this multiplicity which stems 
from its love of the body which makes it one ousia.64  “This is why Plato 
did not say it was many beasts, but one beast with many heads, which 
lives at one time according to one and at another time according to an-
other of its heads, but always in love with the body.”65  This is a nice 
solution. 
He goes further in his analysis, and offers an ingenious explanation of 
why epithymia has these two main branches. Epithymia is a friend of the 
body and desires nothing but its preservation. But body as the object of 
appetite is double. Epithymia desires both the natural state of the body 
itself, and therefore is a lover of pleasure, and the necessary means of 
preserving this natural state, and therefore is a lover of riches. So insofar 
as both love of pleasure and love of riches have as their aim the preser-
vation of the natural state of the body, they do not conflict, and Socrates 
is correct in saying that they stem from a single part of the soul. How-
ever, both of these desires tend to lose the natural state as their proper 
end. The first sort of desire, for the natural state of the body, tends 
instead to take as its end pleasure, which Proclus says accompanies or 
follows the path to the natural state.66  The second sort of desire, for the 
means to preserve the natural state, tends to take the means (riches) as 
an end in itself. And because both pleasure and riches are material (hy-
lika) these desires fight each other. He means by this simply that the 
acquisition of pleasures requires one to spend money, and the miser 
accumulates by foregoing pleasures.67  
According to the three-quality theory, we should expect epithymia to 
have parts. However, Proclus also states in this essay that thymos has two 
 
63. In Remp. I.225.22-23. 
64. In Remp. I.225.3-226.11. 
65. In Remp. I..226.8-11. 
66. In Remp. I.227.6-9: “Since one [appetite], instead of preserving the natural state 
[of the body] desires what accompanies the road to the natural state of the body it is in 
(ejpeidh; de; h} me;n ajnti; tou' swv/zein to; kata; fuvsin tou' parakolouqhvmato" ojrevgetai 
th'" eij" to; kata; fuvsin oJdou' tou' ejn w|/ ejstin) 
67. In Remp. I.226.22-227.27. 
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branches, and for a reason similar to why epithymia is double. In explain-
ing Socrates’ comment that Justice in the soul puts into order the three 
parts of this soul “and any others there may be in between,”68  Proclus 
states that thymos has two branches – love of honour (to philotimon), and 
the part which gets angry (to orgistikon) – just as epithymia is both love of 
riches and love of pleasure.69  What he means by this is clarified by an 
earlier discussion, in which Proclus asserts that the diversity of characters 
in nations is due to differences in which part of their souls is dominant, 
and is not due to differences in bodily temperaments (tais krasesin tou 
somatos). He does admit that in men without education (tois apaideutois) the 
soul puts forth differences in character because it follows, in a certain 
sense, bodily temperaments. But it is not all of thymos or epithymia which 
is affected in this way. It is not the love of honour or the love of riches, 
but the part of thymos which gets angry (to orgilon) and the love of pleasure 
which are affected by bodily temperaments. In the educated man not 
even these two branches of the irrational parts will be affected, or at least 
not very much.70   
I am not quite sure what to say about this, because one would expect 
Proclus to say that thymos is also hen kai polla if it has these two branches. 
However, he does not really give an explanation of why thymos is partless 
according to the three-quality theory, even though it has these two bran-
ches, nor exactly how the part of thymos which gets angry is more allied 
to the body than the honour-loving part, which it is clear despises the 
body.71  Perhaps he would argue that the love of honour and anger do 
not fall into conflict, as the love of money and love of pleasure do, and 
so thymos is more one than epithymia, despite its two branches.72 In all of 
this, as well, we must remember that the soul itself is one unified thing, 
and we are not speaking of ‘parts’ in the same exclusive manner as we 
would speak of the parts of bodies. 
 
68. Resp. 443d. 
69. In Remp. I.231.22-232.14. 
70. In Remp. I.222.4-23. 
71. In Remp. I.231.4-6. Perhaps the love of war and vengeance can be considered to 
involve one more in the body and its passions than the pure love of honour. 
72. He does not in fact argue this, but it would seem to be the line he would have to 
take if it is the mutual conflict of love of pleasure and love of riches which shows 
epithymia to be hen kai polla. We can observe that the source of conflict between the two 
branches of epithymia is the materiality of their objects. In short, you must either save 
money or spend it, and if you save it you will not receive pleasures. We could imagine 
situations in which the love of honour and anger fall into conflict. However, as aiming at 
immaterial goods, it might be possible that Proclus doesn’t see them as necessarily falling 
into conflict, as is the case with an epithymia which mistakes means for ends. However, I 
offer this only as a suggestion. 
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Near the end of his essay Proclus deals with the question of how the 
soul is one thing, even though it has all of these parts. He reports a chal-
lenge by the Stoic Medios,73  who divided the soul into eight parts. Asked 
by Longinus how his soul could still be one, Medios replied that Plato 
had the same problem with his tripartite soul. However, responds Pro-
clus, Medios has his problem because he is a Stoic, and his divisions are 
therefore corporeal divisions. Plato, on the other hand, says that the soul 
is immaterial, and so does not have the same worry, because incorporeal 
things are united without confusion.74  
Moreover, the soul is divided into logos and the irrational parts, with 
logos being more divine than the other parts, maintaining and ordering 
them. Proclus says their unity is analogous to that of form and matter, 
where it is the form which introduces unity. There is no need of a third 
term which unifies them. The soul’s logos holds the place of form, and 
itself is able to unify the irrational life (ten alogon zoen) of the soul.75  Likely 
what Proclus means here over and above with the idea that the soul’s 
ousia is hen kai polla, one and many, is that logos gives the soul as a whole 
unity, through the directives which come from its rule. In that sense, the 
just soul would be more one than the unjust. 
 
73. See ref. in Festugière 1970, vol. 2, p. 38, note 5. 
74. In Remp. I.233.29-234.17. 
75. In Remp. I.234.21-25. 
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VII 
At this point it is obvious that this essay offers a fairly robust account 
of what one might call the ‘political soul’. It is considerably more com-
plex than the simple division into logos, thymos and epithymia found in the 
Republic, while at the same time remaining faithful to the Republic’s 
schema through a sort of total deconstruction and reconstruction which 
we often find in Proclus.76 This account also shows that with a few nuan-
ces the political psychology of the Republic can do something we might 
really like it to do: give an account of the complexity of actual political 
behaviour. 
As I mentioned above, Proclus thinks that the different characters of 
various national peoples have their source in differences in their souls. 
All human beings have the same psychic structure, but a person’s overall 
character is determined by the part of the soul of which they make most 
use, and which consequently comes to be dominant in them.77  Hence 
the Greeks are pratically wise, the Thracians thymotic, and the Phoeni-
cians are good at making money.78  I am not suggesting that each nation 
only be classified in this simple manner, and Proclus’ theory is not quite 
this simple.  
The first thing to notice is that the idea of the dominance of one part 
of the soul or another is a necessary precision of the Republic’s account. 
Without this precision, none of the inhabitants of the city in speech 
would actually be human, because each would possess only one third of 
a soul. A dominance of one part over the other, rather than the exclusive 
possession of one part, may be what the Socrates of the Republic actually 
meant, and the account of the degeneration of the city and the soul in 
books VIII and IX might indicate this.79 In any case, Proclus’ account in 
which the soul is strongly one, but with parts which are more or less 
dominant allows for a more unified and fluid idea of character than the 
myth of the metals in the soul would suggest.80 
 
76. What I mean by “total deconstruction and reconstruction” is the following. In 
essence, Proclus often begins with an account which he finds in Plato, carefully isolating 
each element. Then he discusses each element, in this case of the tripartite soul, making 
distinctions and additions in order to fit it into his much more complex metaphysics. An 
example is the two-fold distinction in Plato (Tim. 28a) between noesei meta logou and doxei 
met’ aistheseos alogou which becomes in Proclus a fourfold distinction between noesis, logos, 
doxa, and aisthesis (In Tim. I.243.27-248.6). Finally he puts it all back together in such a 
way that the original account is preserved, but now forms the skeleton of his own much 
more robust and baroque theory. 
77. In Remp. I.221.24-27. 
78. In Remp. I.221.20-24. 
79. See Resp. 550b. 
80. Resp. 415a-c. 
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Second, this idea of dominance also allows Proclus to talk about 
forms of life which are mixed. He does describe lives of logos, thymos, and 
epithymia, devoted exclusively to knowledge, honour, and pleasure.81  But 
he also describes lives which fall between these pure forms. As we have 
already seen, even the lives of thymos and epithymia allow the distinction 
between honour, anger (probably the martial life), riches, and pleasure. 
He goes further, however, and thinks Socrates alludes to lives which 
conform both to logos and thymos, or to thymos and epithymia, and that the 
lives which the soul lives are not unmixed. Men, for example, who pur-
sue knowledge in order to be honoured for their learning, as well as men 
who pursue honour in order to be appreciated by men who have know-
ledge, would be living mixed lives of the first sort. On the other hand, 
both men who pursue riches in order to gain honour from men who 
admire the rich, and men who pursue honours in order to amass riches, 
would be living mixed lives of the second sort. It is interesting to note 
that Proclus does not include in his examples of mixed lives either of the 
lives which follow bodily temperaments, that of the angry man and of 
the pleasure-seeker, but they could probably be accomodated. The idea 
of mixed lives would likely allow Proclus to give an account of many of 
the various existing characters in terms of the basic parts of the Platonic 
political soul, and to do so within an account of political virtue and vice. 
VIII 
As I have said, Proclus’ own exposition in this essay is rather brief, at 
times quite enigmatic, and a bit scattered in its order of exposition. How-
ever, if one looks at its contents in a more orderly manner than Proclus 
actually presents, as I have tried to do, we find the sort of engagement 
with politics which O’Meara details in Platonopolis. In this 7th essay of the 
In Rempublicam Proclus supplies in fact the elements of a quite robust 
Neoplatonic political philosophy. 
In this short essay, Proclus gives an account of political virtue, by 
examining the parts of the soul insofar as it is master of the body and 
master of itself. The soul which has entered into relation with a terrestrial 
body possesses a mixture of psychic parts, which on their own would 
express an activity proper to immaterial mind on the one hand, and to 
irrational beasts on the other. But because these parts are together within 
a single life, they have relations of ruling and being ruled which are 
governed by the political virtues. As we have seen, these relations can be 
quite complex, and go some way towards explaining the complexity of 
actual political action. Proclus’ theory would allow him to accept Plato’s 
 
81. In Remp. I.231.1-8. 
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account of the varieties of good and bad men, and good and bad states, 
and in some ways give a more nuanced account of these. 
Of course, the Neoplatonists did not consider political virtue to be 
the final word. The man who has mastered himself in his relation to 
body must begin to purify himself of all bodily interest, and begin in this 
life his ascent to the noetic and henadic union which is the true aim of 
the happy man. 82 
 
82. Baltzly 2004 discusses Julia Annas’ point that the Platonic moral ideal of assimila-
tion to god moves in two possibly contradictory directions. On the one hand, moral vir-
tue requires an engagement in this world, while on the other, flight to the divine requires 
that we disengage from our bodily life. Baltzly argues that Proclus is less susceptible to 
this tension than Plotinus, because Proclus’ rejection of Plotinus’ doctrine of the undes-
cended soul means that the human soul is more engaged in this world than it is for Ploti-
nus. I think Baltzly is correct in pointing out that Proclus’ adoption of the hierarchy of 
virtue, which includes the level of political virtue, means that there is such a thing for him 
as meaningful engagement with this world. However, I disagree with Baltzly’s judgement 
of the degree to which Proclus thinks the soul is at home in the material world. Although 
its possession of the political virtues does imply that its presence in a material body is not 
a pure evil for the soul, and he says that its descent is due to its imitation of the providen-
tial activity of the gods (In Tim. III.5-24), Proclus also states clearly that life in the body is 
troublesome for souls (In Tim. III.25-13), and that it is not natural for them. Rather, a se-
parate, imaterial, and incorporeal life is proper for the soul (In Alc. 256.11-14, In Remp. II. 
349.20-26). So the other side of the tension also seems to be present. Part of Baltzly’s 
argument rests on his interpretation of the well-known ‘complete descent’ of the Procline 
soul into genesis, with no part remaining above (El.Th. prop. 211). This seems to imply, as 
Baltzly says, that “We can come to know the various levels within Intellect and the 
henads only by means of their logoi or images within our souls… The perfection of our 
natures which is effected through becoming virtuous is a perfection of an essentially psychic 
nature. Proclus should therefore reject the view that the civic virtues are ever left behind” 
(p. 308-309). Baltzly is correct in thinking that the defining characteristic of the Procline 
soul is its knowledge of all things through its own discursive projection of logoi; see 
MacIsaac 2001. However, this discursive activity is related in complex ways to other, 
non-discursive or not-completely discursive elements and activities within the soul. This 
relation is indicated by passages on the soul’s noesis (In Tim. I.247.10-25) and on its hypar-
xis (Plat. Theol. I.3.15.1-16.1 Saffrey-Westerink), as well as his use of the terms the “flower 
of nous” (anthos nou) (Phil. Chald. 210.29 Des Places), the “flower of the soul” (anthos tes 
psyches) (In Parm. 1071. 30), the “one of the soul” (hen tes psyches) (In Parm. 1071.26),
 
the 
“most unified part of the soul” (henoeidestaton tes psyches) (Phil. Chald. 210.30 Des Places), 
and the “highest part of the soul” (akrotaton tes psyches) (In Tim. II.203.31), and by such 
descriptions as at In Crat. 34.4-5, of associating our own noesis with the divine light. To 
my knowledge, no one has explained satisfactorily the relation between the discursive and 
non-discursive knowing activities of the Procline soul, especially with regard to his 
statement in the Elements that no part remains above when it descends into genesis. Put 
simply, if no part remains above, what status does the soul’s ousia, its noesis, or its ‘one’ or 
‘flower’ have in the completely descended soul? For a discussion which touches on this, 
see Steel 1978, p. 46-47, 69-73. See also Mazilu 2008, p. 71-83. For the fullest discussion, 
see Gritti 2008, p. 75-77, 109-120. Gritti’s account is very good, but I do not agree with 
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